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Abstract
In Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and
Ahani v. MCI, the Supreme Court of Canada declared
that removing a refugee accused of terrorism to a country
where he or she would face a substantial risk of torture or
similar abuse would virtually always violate the individ-
ual’s rights under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. While the Court deserves praise for vindi-
cating fundamental human rights over competing claims
of national security, coming so close on the heels of Sep-
tember 11, the victory is in certain respects more apparent
than real. Given the strong endorsement of judicial defer-
ence to the exercise of Ministerial discretion in national se-
curity matters, the Court leaves the state wide scope to
circumvent the spirit of the judgment while adhering to its
letter.
Résumé
Dans les cas Suresh c. Ministre de la citoyenneté et de
l’immigration, et Ahani c. MCI, la Cour suprême du
Canada a statué que le transfert d’un réfugié accusé de
terrorisme vers un pays où il ou elle court des risques sub-
stantiels d’être soumis à la torture ou à des mauvais
traitements similaires, violerait presque à tout coup, les
droits de l’individu prévus à la s. 7 de la Charte canadi-
enne des droits et libertés. La Cour mérite d’être
félicitée pour avoir donné préférence aux droits fonda-
mentaux de la personne aux dépens des pressions concur-
rentes en faveur de la sécurité nationale. Cependant,
succédant de si près les événements du 11 septembre,
cette victoire est, par certains côtés, plus apparente que
réelle. Vu l’aval donné à la prééminence du pouvoir dis-
crétionnaire ministériel sur le judiciaire en ce qui con-
cerne les questions de sécurité nationale, la Cour donne
beaucoup de latitude à l’état pour contourner l’esprit du
jugement tout en en respectant la lettre.
Introduction
I
n May 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada heard the
appeals of Manickavasagam Suresh and Mansour
Ahani, two refugees deemed terrorists. At stake was the
power of the state under s. 53 of the Immigration Act to
refoule refugees back to their countries of nationality on
grounds that they posed a threat to the security of Canada.
The Court reserved judgment in both cases. The Supreme
Court of Canada was still deliberating on the appropriate
balance between national security and human rights when
the first plane crashed into the World Trade Center on
September 11. The Court released its unanimous decisions
in Suresh v. Canada1 and Ahani v. Canada2 on January 11,
2002, exactly four months later.
The Canadian Supreme Court was not the only judiciary
to issue decisions about refugees and security in the shadow
of September 11. During this same period, the British
House of Lords rendered a judgment affirming the depor-
tation order against a Pakistani cleric alleged to constitute
a national security threat.3 Around the same time the
United States began bombing Afghanistan, and the Austra-
lian High Court upheld Prime Minister John Howard’s
policy of deflecting boatloads of Afghan refugee claimants.4
At moments of real or perceived threat to the integrity of
a democratic state, the responsibility of the judiciary to
protect human rights comes under special scrutiny. Will the
Court validate the political calculus of elected officials, or
will it deploy its status as an independent, unaccountable,
norm-generating body to check the majoritarian tendency
to compromise the rights of the few in the name of protect-
ing the many? Without actually acknowledging their own
role as arbiters, the Court in Suresh launches its judgment by
evoking the classic tension between liberty and security:
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On the one hand stands the manifest evil of terrorism and the
random and arbitrary taking of innocent lives, rippling out in
an ever-widening spiral of loss and fear. Governments, express-
ing the will of the governed, need the legal tools to effectively
meet this challenge. On the other hand stands the need to ensure
that those legal tools do not undermine values that are funda-
mental to our democratic society – liberty, the rule of law, and
the principles of fundamental justice – values that lie at the heart
of the Canadian  constitutional order  and the  international
instruments that Canada has signed. In the end, it would be a
Pyrrhic victory if terrorism were defeated at the cost of sacrific-
ing our commitment to those values. Parliament’s challenge is
to draft laws that effectively combat terrorism and conform to
the requirements of our Constitution and our international
commitments.5
The judgments in Suresh and Ahani reveal how the Su-
preme Court of Canada chose to situate itself at a particular
historical moment. The Court selected Suresh as the lead
judgment, and it contains the detailed recitation of facts and
extensive legal analysis that sustain the results in both cases.
I will argue that while Mr. Suresh appears to occupy the
starring role in the legal drama scripted by the Court, it is
actually Mr. Ahani, the “sinister” character lurking down-
stage and in the shadows, whose fate prefigures that of
future refugees caught up in Canada’s security dragnet.
Background
Manickavasagam Suresh, a Sri Lankan Tamil, entered Can-
ada in 1990. He made a refugee claim based on his fear of
persecution by the Sri Lankan government and the Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He was recognized as a
Convention refugee in 1991, and applied for permanent
resident status thereafter. His application was delayed, and
in 1995 the Solicitor General and the Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration issued a “security certificate” under s. 40.1
of the Immigration Act alleging that Suresh was inadmissible
on security grounds. The specific provisions under which
Suresh was ultimately determined to be inadmissible permit
the exclusion of a person who there are reasonable grounds
to believe is or was a member of an organization that there
are reasonable grounds to believe is, was, or will be engaging
in terrorism.6
The factual basis for the allegation was that Suresh acted
as a fundraiser for the World Tamil Movement, an organi-
zation that is either part of, or supports, the LTTE. The
government took the position that the LTTE is a terrorist
organization, and that Suresh was a member of it by virtue
of his involvement with the World Tamil Movement. At no
time was Suresh accused of engaging in violent activities in
Canada or abroad. Indeed, his act of fundraising was not
unlawful, though this may no longer be the case under
Canada’s new Anti-Terrorism Act.7
The Federal Court upheld the security certificate on
judicial review, and the Minister of Citizenship and Immi-
gration then notified Suresh that she was considering issu-
ing a “danger opinion” declaring Suresh to represent a
danger to the security of Canada. The issuance of a danger
opinion by the Minister grants her discretion to order the
return (refoulement) of a refugee to a country where the
person’s life or freedom would be threatened, thereby cre-
ating an exception to the singular protection afforded to
refugees by states party to the U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees. Counsel for Suresh contended that he
would face a substantial risk of torture if returned to Sri
Lanka.
A memo provided to the Minister (but not disclosed to
Suresh) speculated that Suresh’s high profile would render
him less likely to be tortured upon return to Sri Lanka but
that, even if the risk of torture was substantial, “there are
insufficient humanitarian and compassionate considera-
tions present to warrant an extraordinary consideration.”8
The Minister issued the danger opinion, thereby paving the
way for Suresh’s deportation to Sri Lanka. Suresh applied
for judicial review of the danger opinion and of the inad-
missibility provisions, on administrative and constitutional
grounds. He was unsuccessful at the Federal Court trial and
appeal levels, and ultimately appealed to the Supreme
Court of Canada.
Suresh challenged various aspects of the Immigration Act
and the Minister’s conduct. He argued that deportation to
a country where he would face a substantial risk of torture
violated Canada’s international human rights obligations
as well as s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms. Section 7 guarantees that “[e]veryone has the right to
life, liberty and security of the person, and the right not be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice.”
Suresh also contended that the terms “terrorism,” “dan-
ger to the security of Canada,” and “member,” as employed
(but not defined) in the Immigration Act, were unconstitu-
tionally vague. He further claimed that deportation on the
basis of mere membership violated the Charter rights to
freedom of expression (s. 2(b)) and association (s. 2(d)).
Apart from the defects in the legislative scheme, Suresh
also argued that the Minister owed him a duty of fairness
in the exercise of her discretion, and she had breached that
duty by failing to give him a proper hearing, disclosure of
the evidence against him, and reasons for her decision to
refoule him to Sri Lanka.
Mansour Ahani, an Iranian national, entered Canada
and acquired refugee status in 1991. The Canadian Security
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and Intelligence Service (CSIS) formed the opinion that
Ahani was a trained assassin for the Iranian Ministry of
Intelligence Security (MOIS). Ahani met with CSIS agents
upon return from a trip to Europe, and allegedly admitted
to them that he had met with a former MOIS associate. In
June 1993, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
and the Solicitor General issued a certificate declaring
Ahani to be inadmissible both as a member of a terrorist
organization and as one who there are reasonable grounds
to believe has engaged or will engage in acts of terrorism or
violence that “would or might endanger the lives or safety of
persons in Canada.”9 Pursuant to legislative authority, Ahani
was arrested in 1993 and has remained in custody ever since.
As between the two men, Suresh was clearly the more
sympathetic appellant: As a Tamil, he belongs to a minority
that has experienced systematic and often brutal discrimi-
nation and oppression by the Sinhalese majority and gov-
ernment. As noted earlier, he was not directly associated
with violence. Accompanied by many supporters from the
Canadian Tamil community, Suresh attended his hearing
before the Supreme Court of Canada. Moreover, eight
interveners lent their support and credibility to his appeal,
including the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Amnesty International, and the Canadian Bar
Association.
In contrast, Ahani was an alleged political assassin em-
ployed by a widely reviled regime. Unsurprisingly, he was
not a popular man in the Iranian community, many of
whom had fled the current government. Not a single inter-
vener in Suresh participated in Ahani, even though the legal
issues (and even legal counsel) were identical in both cases.
Ahani remained in detention on the day of his hearing, an
absent presence before the Court.
There are many layers to the decisions in Suresh and
Ahani. One may begin with a description of the form in
which the judgments were rendered. Both were delivered
unanimously under the collective authorship of the Court.
Decisions issued by “the Court,” rather than under the
name of the judge who authored it, are usually reserved for
cases that not only raise contentious issues, but which also
have the potential to become flashpoints for debate over the
legitimacy of judicial review in a democracy.10 Arguably,
Suresh did not  raise issues  that were intrinsically  more
“political” than many other cases; nevertheless, the timing
of the decision ensured that it would attract controversy.
The image of a united Court potentially reduces the scope for
politicizing the judgment by withholding alternative legal
analyses from critics. It also precludes the tactic of telescoping
criticism onto the personality of the author, thereby confining
detractors to a broad institutional critique of the Court.
Deportation and Torture
The starkest question before the Court was whether re-
turning a non-citizen to a country where he or she faced
a substantial risk of torture violated fundamental human
rights obligations binding upon Canada. But which hu-
man rights obligations? Canada is constrained from with-
out by international law. It is constrained from within by
Canada’s own constitutional commitments as articulated in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture (CAT)
prohibit deporting an individual to torture. Canada ratified
the two instruments in 1976 and 1987 respectively. The
Supreme Court of Canada adopted the CAT definition of
torture and, subsequent to Suresh, the government incor-
porated the CAT definition into the new Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act. It states as follows:
Article 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment
1. For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act
by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as ob-
taining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing
him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.
2. This article is without prejudice to any international in-
strument or national legislation which does or may contain
provisions of wider application.
In addition to the CAT and other international instru-
ments, a considerable body of state practice and interna-
tional authority support the contention that an absolute
prohibition on torture is a peremptory norm of customary
international law (jus cogens), which binds Canada inde-
pendently of any treaty obligation.11
Meanwhile, s. 7 of the Charter guarantees to everyone
“the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice.” In the landmark case
of Singh v. Minister of Employment & Immigration,12 the
Supreme Court of Canada ruled that sending refugee claim-
ants back to their country of origin would jeopardize their
s. 7 right to security of the person. In Suresh, the issue was
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whether s. 7 if the Charter permitted return of a person to
face torture if he was found to be a security risk in Canada.
In the course of the judgment, the Court diminishes the
authoritative force of international law by implying that
Canada’s treaty obligations regarding torture had never
been formally incorporated into Canadian law, and thus do
not bind Canada.13 The Court also shies away from accord-
ing the prohibition on torture the status of jus cogens.14
Further, the Court asserts that, in any event, it is the
Charter, and not international law, which supplies the
normative standard against which Canadian law will be
measured:
Our concern is not with Canada’s international obligations qua
obligations; rather, our concern is with the principles of funda-
mental justice [under s. 7]. We look to international law as
evidence of these principles and not as controlling in itself.15
One might reasonably contend that it matters little
whether the Court takes the route of international law or
the Charter if the destination turns out to be the same.
Nevertheless, the subordination of international law to the
role of interpretive tool for domestic law reveals a certain
symmetry between who decides the terms of entry into the
country and who determines the terms of entry into the
legal order. In both cases, the answer is national authorities,
acting according to domestic law.
Policing the borders is seen as a matter of national sov-
ereign control, and to the extent that the UN Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees shears this power, inter-
preting the available exceptions to the duty to admit refu-
gees emerges as a site for reclamation of control.
Domesticating international law through the Charter
means that Canadian law remains answerable ultimately
only to Canadian law, as interpreted by Canadian judges.
Because the Supreme Court of Canada provides the final
word on Canadian law, international treaty bodies (such as
the UN Committee against Torture) that advise states party
of the scope of the international norm, do not challenge the
Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretive monopoly. As if to
reinforce their dominion, the Supreme Court of Canada
declined to hear a subsequent appeal by Ahani that his
deportation should be stayed pending the outcome of his
application to the UN Human Rights Committee for con-
sideration as to whether his human rights under the UN
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would be violated
upon return to Iran. A majority of the Ontario Court of
Appeal ruled that s. 7 of the Charter did not require the
Canadian government to await the communication of the
Human Rights Committee and take its views into account
before proceeding with the deportation.16
In its s. 7 analysis, the Court rules that deporting a person
to a country where he or she faces a substantial risk of torture
will virtually always violate the life, liberty, and security of the
person in a manner that does not comport with fundamental
justice. The Court emphatically rejects the government’s
attempt to evade responsibility for what another country
might do to a deportee. Instead, it affirms that:
. . . where Canada’s participation is a necessary precondition for
the deprivation [of life, liberty, and security of the person], and
where the deprivation is an entirely foreseeable consequence of
Canada’s participation, the government does not avoid the
guarantee of fundamental justice merely because the depriva-
tion in question would be effected by someone else’s hand.”17
This constitutional accountability for complicity in the hu-
man rights violations of actors beyond the reach of the
Charter warrants closer scrutiny, for the Court tacitly admits
that the polycentric matrix dubbed “globalization” creates
not only economic and security interconnections, but also
networks of moral responsibility.18
The Court concludes that the Minister “should generally
decline to deport refugees where on the evidence there is a
substantial risk of torture.”19 Although it allowed for the
theoretical possibility of departures from the rule, the
Court declines to articulate any examples, saying only that
“the ambit of an exceptional discretion to deport to torture,
if any, must await future cases.”20
A year prior to Suresh, the Supreme Court of Canada
reversed earlier s. 7 jurisprudence by ruling that the Minis-
ter of Justice could not normally extradite a fugitive to face
the possibility of capital punishment in the United States
without requesting assurances that the death penalty would
be neither sought nor imposed.21 In light of this decision in
Burns and Rafay, the finding that deportation to face torture
would also violate s. 7 is perhaps unsurprising, though no
less salutary for that reason.
The determination that Canada may not generally de-
port a person to face torture represents the climax of the
legal narrative. To grasp its significance in the real life stories
of refugees who come after Suresh, one must attend to some
of the Court’s less dramatic pronouncements, and the way in
which they steer Ahani’s appeal toward its resolution.
Interpretation and Discretion
The path to refouling a refugee is paved with a series of
discretionary rulings by the Minister. It begins with the
Minister issuing a certificate labelling the refugee inadmis-
sible as a terrorist, either because of his or her own past,
present, or future “terrorist” actions or due to membership
in a “terrorist” organization. This finding must be upheld as
Volume 20 Refuge Number 4

“reasonable” by a reviewing judge of the Federal Court. The
next step involves an opinion by the Minister under s. 53 of
the Immigration Act that the refugee poses a threat to the
security of Canada on account of terrorism. From there, the
Minister makes a finding about the consequences of refoule-
ment, which in turn grounds the balancing exercise between
Canada’s security and the likely fate of the refugee upon
return. Only in circumstances where the person concerned
faces a substantial risk of “torture or similar abuse”22 will the
Charter generally prohibit refoulement.
One need  never  confront  the  prospect of refouling a
refugee if the refugee is not a “terrorist,” or does not pose
“a danger to the security of Canada.” More insidiously, one
need  not  engage in the  exercise  of  balancing Canadian
security against the likely torture of a human being if the
Minister concludes that what awaits the refugee constitutes
some lesser harm. In the result, the legal content of the
terms “danger to security of Canada,” “terrorism,” and
“membership” become crucial filtering mechanisms, as
does  the process by which the Minister determines the
nature of the risk facing the refugee.
Counsel for the appellants and several interveners ar-
gued strenuously that “terrorism” is an ineluctably political
term and unconstitutionally vague in its ambit. The Immi-
gration Act does not define it, and the Federal Court con-
sistently refused to interpret the term, preferring instead the
“I know it when I see it” approach. According to the appel-
lants and some interveners, “terrorism” does not admit of
a  neutral  conceptual  definition.  At  best, it can only be
defined functionally, by reference to specific prohibited
acts, most of which are criminal in any event.
The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledges these cri-
tiques, but ultimately is “not persuaded … that the term
‘terrorism’ is so unsettled that it cannot set the proper
boundaries for legal adjudication.”23 The Court adopts the
definition employed in the recent International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,24 and de-
fines terrorism for purposes of the Immigration Act as:
Any act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population,
or to compel a government or an international organization to
do or to abstain from doing any act.25
While acknowledging room for disagreement at the mar-
gins, the Court feels confident that this definition captures
“the essence of what the world understands by ‘terrorism’,”26
though Parliament is not precluded from adopting an alter-
native definition.27
One may cavil over the Court’s definition of terrorism,
but at least the Court confines its scope to acts of serious
violence. Unfortunately, the Court does little to clarify what
it means to be a member of a terrorist organization, which
is the provision used to label Suresh a terrorist. The Court
indicates only that “member” encompasses “persons who are
or have been associated with things directed at violence, if not
violence itself,” while excluding those who associate with (or
contribute to) organizations in ignorance of the group’s ter-
rorist activities.28Replacing thenoun“member” with the verb
“associate” is distinctly unhelpful, especially since the Court
declines to elaborate upon the indicia of association.
The opacity of the Court’s discussion of membership is
revealed by the fact that the judgment does not explain
whether or how Suresh’s fundraising activities for the
World Tamil Movement (WTM) were sufficient to make
him a member of the LTTE. Nor is it evident what conclu-
sion the Court ought to draw in light of its definition,
though one might infer by its silence that the Federal Court
did not err in upholding the certificate which found Suresh
inadmissible on the basis of membership. Nevertheless, if
one cannot confidently apply a definition developed in the
context of an appeal to the actual fact situation presented
in the case, one might conclude that the definition is rather
unsatisfactory. Of even greater concern is the fact that the
potential breadth of an imprecise definition of membership
eviscerates the virtue of a relatively narrow definition of
terrorism. Few persons may engage in “terrorist” activities,
as terrorism is defined, but a great many may be caught in
the expansive sweep of “membership” in an organization
that engages in terrorism.
The finding of inadmissibility based on membership in
a terrorist organization forms the basis of a Ministerial
opinion that the person poses a “danger to the security of
Canada.” The Court resists the claim that risks to Canadian
security include only those activities that pose a threat to
Canada and not another country,29 stating simply that
whatever the justification for this limitation in the past,
“after the year 2001, that approach is no longer valid.”30
Rejecting the argument that “danger to the security of
Canada” is unconstitutionally vague, the Court furnishes
the following definition:
While the phrase “danger to the security of Canada” must be
interpreted flexibly, and while courts need not insist on direct
proof that the danger targets Canada specifically, the fact re-
mains that to refoule a refugee …to torture requires evidence of
a serious threat to national security. To suggest that something
less than serious threats founded on evidence would suffice to
deport a refugee to torture would be to condone unconstitu-
tional application of the Immigration Act. . . .
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These considerations lead us to conclude that a person consti-
tutes a “danger to the security of Canada” if he or she poses a
serious threat to the security of Canada, whether direct or
indirect, and bearing in mind the fact that the security of one
country is often dependent on the security of other nations. The
threat must be “serious”, in the sense that it must be grounded
on objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and in
the sense that the threatened harm must be substantial rather
than negligible.31
In principle, the finding of inadmissibility on grounds of
terrorism does not prove that the refugee poses a danger to
the security Canada, since s. 53 requires that the person
must be inadmissible and that “the Minister is of the opin-
ion that the person constitutes a danger to the security of
Canada.” One might speculate that a person who is deemed
inadmissible on the basis of an attenuated association with
an organization that carries on diverse activities (ranging
from provision of social services to violence) might not
necessarily pose a danger to the security of Canada. The
Court declines the opportunity supplied by the factual
context in Suresh to provide guidance on this matter. Suresh
was a fundraiser for the World Tamil Movement, not the
LTTE, but the judgment does not explore the actual rela-
tionship between the WTM and the LTTE, or explain why
it is sufficient to constitute membership in a terrorist or-
ganization.
Standard of Review and Procedural Fairness
The Court undertakes to give legal content to “danger to the
security of Canada,” “terrorism,” and, to some extent,
“membership” in order to thwart the claim that the terms
are unconstitutionally vague, or violate the Charter guaran-
tees of freedom of expression (s. 2(b)) and association (s.
2(d)). In so doing, the Court constrains the ability of the
Minister and the Department of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion to arbitrarily attach those designations to individuals.
Section 7’s virtual prohibition on deporting a person to face
torture similarly circumscribes Ministerial discretion.
What remains, however, is the Minister’s discretion to
formulate an opinion about whether the refugee is a danger
to the security of Canada and whether the risk faced upon
return equals torture or similar abuse. How closely should
the courts scrutinize the Minister’s exercise of discretion?
The  Supreme  Court makes  it  clear in Suresh that both
decisions warrant maximum deference. With respect to the
first, the Court quotes approvingly from a recent House of
Lords decision, Secretary of State for the Home Department
v. Rehman,32 in which  Lord Hoffman declared that the
events of September 11 “underline the need for the judicial
arm of government to respect the decisions of ministers of
the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist
activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat to na-
tional security.”33 The Court concludes that it should follow
its British cohort and:
. . . adopt a deferential approach to this question and set aside
the Minister’s discretionary decision if it is patently unreason-
able in the sense that it was made arbitrarily or in bad faith, it
cannot be supported on the evidence or the Minister failed to
consider the appropriate factors. The court should not reweigh
the factors or interfere merely because it would have come to a
different conclusion.34
Regarding the standard of review of the Minister’s deci-
sion regarding the consequences of deportation, the Court
describes  the assessment  as  “in  large part a fact-driven
inquiry.”35 The Minister may consider a range of factors,
including the human rights record of the home state, the
personal risk faced by the refugee, the ability of the home
state to control its security forces, the availability of another
state to accept the refugee, etc. According to the Court, this
evaluation by the Minister attracts deference from review-
ing courts, and can only be set aside if, once again, “the
decision is not supported by the evidence or fails to consider
the appropriate factors.”36
Despite the high stakes of deportation, the Court is con-
fident that “a deferential standard of ministerial review will
not prevent human rights issues from being fully addressed,
provided proper procedural safeguards are in place and
provided that any decision to deport meets the constitu-
tional requirements of the Charter.”37 What are the proper
procedural safeguards?  According  to the Court,  the  re-
quirements of fairness fluctuate with the risk facing the
refugee – the greater the potential harm, the more fairness
due the individual.
In effect, the refugee must “establish a threshold showing
that a risk of torture or similar abuse exists before the
Minister is obliged to consider fully the possibility.”38
Where a refugee makes out this prima facie case, the Min-
ister must provide the refugee with notice of the case against
him or her, an opportunity to respond in writing, and
substantive, written reasons for the decision. Suresh had
made out such a prima facie case, and since the Minister had
provided Suresh with no opportunity to respond to the case
against him (as contained in the memo to the Minister),
much less reasons for her decision, Suresh’s appeal was
allowed and the case was remitted back to the Minister for
consideration in conformity with the requirements of pro-
cedural fairness.
And so the story of Mr. Suresh appears to have a happy
ending, or at least a hopeful ending: Having [fortuitously]
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established a prima facie risk of torture, the failure of the
Minister to disclose her assistant’s memo and provide
Suresh right of reply, as well as her refusal to supply written
reasons for her decision, breached a duty of fairness owed
to Suresh. Thus, he is entitled to a new hearing before the
Minister, and a reasonable inference from the Court’s judg-
ment is that Suresh’s “terrorist” membership qua fun-
draiser would not justify an exception to the general
prohibition against refouling a refugee to face torture.
But what of Mr. Ahani? The Court has little difficulty
disposing of his appeal. Ahani had not established a prima
facie case that he would be exposed to torture upon return
to Iran; therefore, he was not entitled to know and respond
to the contents of the memo to the Minister. Nor was he
entitled to reasons for the decision to deport him. The
Court concludes that the Minister had properly exercised
her discretion in arriving at the opinion that Ahani posed a
danger to the security of Canada and that the risk to Canada
by his remaining outweighed whatever risk faced him in
Iran. Her  decision  was  not  patently unreasonable and
therefore warranted judicial deference.
Of course, Ahani would have had no way of knowing at
the time he made his submission to the Minister that he was
required to demonstrate a prima facie risk of torture in
order to attract a duty of fairness. Section 53 is silent
regarding procedural protections, and places no limits on
the Minister’s power to deport. The limitation regarding
deportation to torture was “read in” to the legislation via s.
7 of the Charter. In dismissing his appeal, the Supreme
Court of Canada effectively found that Ahani had failed to
meet a standard that did not yet exist as a prerequisite to
obtaining procedural protections that had never been pro-
vided in the past, which were to be implemented in exercis-
ing discretion for which no limiting factors had yet been
articulated.
One cannot but wonder whether rejecting this Middle-
Eastern man, alleged to be a hired assassin for a brutal
Islamist regime, provided a useful counterweight to the
relatively favourable outcome for Suresh, whose activities
were non-violent and not even unlawful at the relevant
time. Permitting an [indirect] fundraiser to remain in Can-
ada is surely less controversial than the prospect of allowing
a hired assassin to stay indefinitely because he might be
tortured if returned to his country of nationality. What
better way to convey an image of transcendent judicial
neutrality and perfect balance between liberty and security
than a tie score – refugee 1: government 1.
But of course, there will be other non-citizens who come
after Mr. Suresh and Mr. Ahani. Some will be refugees who
face persecution, torture, or death if returned. What do the
decisions in Suresh and Ahani presage?
After Suresh, a decision to deliberately deport a person
to face a substantial risk of torture will (or should) come at
a high political cost. On the other hand, thanks to Ahani, if
the Minister determines that the individual has not made
out a prima facie case of torture, there is no requirement to
inform the refugee of the case against him or her, to provide
the refugee with an opportunity to respond to the evidence
marshalled against him or her, or to provide reasons for the
decision. Even if the Minister concedes that a prima facie
case has been established, the Minister can still decide that
after careful review, the evidence does not support a sub-
stantial risk of torture or similar abuse. Suresh confirms that
each of these interim exercises of discretion will be subject
to the most deferential standard of review, meaning that the
exercise of discretion must be “patently unreasonable” to
warrant judicial intervention. In practice, no one will be
returned to face a substantial risk of torture if the Minister
always forms the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to
establish a substantial risk of torture, and if the courts system-
atically defer to the Minister’s assessment of that risk.
After September 11, Canada passed a new Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, as well as the Anti-Terrorism
Act. The latter was in direct response to September 11. The
new immigration legislation does not materially alter the
process to which Suresh and Ahani were subject, and I
suspect that deportation under immigration law will be the
instrument of  choice  (rather than  criminal prosecution
under the Anti-Terrorism Act) where the suspect is a non-
citizen.
I expect that September 11 will result in more refugees
being entangled in the security web in the future. When the
Court declares in Suresh that “Parliament’s challenge is to
draft laws that effectively combat terrorism and conform to
the requirements of our Constitution and our international
commitments,” they omit to add that the judiciary’s task is
to ensure not only that those laws are constitutional on
paper, but also to scrutinize the implementation of those
laws so that human lives do not fall through the cracks of
discretion into a dark space where the law does not reach.
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